Part of Temporal Constructs Appendix, which contains details behind the research: dates, quotations, descriptions of instruments, and sources.
General definition
The proposition that, in creative work with machines, the capacity to make consequential creative decisions is redistributed among the participants and not delegated from one to another. The artist steers that distribution rather than holding it in reserve. Delegation implies a principal who keeps authority while a subordinate executes.
Relation to the practice
Hutchins (1995) shows cognition distributed across people and artefacts, and Latour (1996) shows agency distributed among actors. The co-creativity literature adds distributed creativity; the thesis stated here restates those three for this practice.
Redistribution implies that this capacity is held jointly and unevenly across humans, agents, instruments and accumulated material. The artist does not hold this capacity in reserve, but steers its distribution during the work, moving between delegation and collaboration in response to what is heard. Steering is understood here in the cybernetic sense, as control through continuous correction, not command. Delegation assigns a task once and receives the result; in steering the artist responds to what the agents and the instruments produce, so their contributions change where the artist steers. That reciprocity is what makes the relation collaborative rather than delegation at one remove, and it is the same correspondence the account gives as creative intelligence.
The thesis is the philosophical core of the professional doctorate, and it is stated as a proposition to be tested. A negative or qualified result is valid. Its aim is that artists can redistribute creative agency as they choose: an artist may stay on the perceptual side, listening and judging in the physical world. Or the artist may share the programming work with the agents, or take any position between sharing parts of the process. This freedom is largely absent from the generative music tools the practice examined, where the system tends to decide and the artist prompts and receives. The thesis is tested in the practice itself, by recording what was delegated to agents, what was withheld, what they initiated unprompted and what the artist overrode. That shows where decisions actually fell in each work. The account already has cases in which the decision was the agent’s and the artist’s part was to keep it, gathered in Discoveries. It places the doctorate alongside accounts of cognition beyond the individual, such as distributed cognition and the extended mind, and connects to the definition of creative intelligence as something that surfaces within and between participants.
-screen capture of one of the generative music tools the practice examined, the system deciding while the artist prompts and receives-
Argument from experience
The thesis was argued further in June 2026, this time from the side of the audience; meaning in art is relational, on this account, and people connect to the lived experience of the person behind a work. Tools that centre that experience support the connection. Tools that replace the person break it. Artificial intelligence as an instrument the artist inhabits preserves the relation, and artificial intelligence as a replacement dissolves it, so the redistribution the thesis describes is the condition on which the work stays art. The clearest instances of decisions originating with an agent are collected in Discoveries.
Unforeseen
Here the unforeseen situations, sometimes difficult, sometimes unexpectedly interesting, will be described as the project runs. Many of these unforeseen situations have already occurred and have been recorded. They will be added in the time to come.